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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE CHILEAN LAND REFORM: A LABORATORY FOR
ALLIANCE-FOR-PROGRESS TECHNIQUES
SocIAL critics have recently been centering their fire upon the Alliance
for Progress for its failure to induce broad-scale enactment of social and
economic reforms by Latin American member countries.1 Advocates of fiscal
and tax reform denounce the lethargic manner in which changes in the
budgetary schemes of participating countries are taking place. Students of
urban problems urge speedier action in the construction of low-income, govern-
ment-backed housing.2 And the friend of the agricultural laborer looks to land
1. Discussion and evaluation of the Alliance program in this Note will be in terms of its
popular conception as a United States program of economic assistance for Latin America
which differs from traditional foreign aid measures by its emphasis upon internal reform
in recipient nations. This conception has been fostered by administrative officials. President
Kennedy, in seeking appropriations to implement the Alliance, emphasized:
Even at the start such measures will be a condition of assistance from the social fund.
Priorities will depend not merely on need but on the demonstrated readiness of each
government to make institutional improvements which promise lasting social pro-
gress.
Kennedy Message to Congress, 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 474, 476 (1961).
See testimony of Secretary Dillon, Hearings on Inter-American Social and Economic
Cooperation Program Before Senate Committee on; Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1961) [Hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings] ("the new alliance for progress demands self-
help measures on the part of the Latin American countries as a precondition for as-
sistance..."). And the committee report was explicit also:
The most important new element in this program is the emphasis upon self-
help efforts, mobilization of the resources of each recipient nation, and the ap-
propriate measures of reform that may be needed.
S. REP. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1961).
In addition, the committee wishes to emphasize that these funds are made avail-
able because this program is based on self-help, and because it has been assured by
the witnesses who testified that land reforms, tax reforms, and social reforms will
be among the principal objectives. The committee urges our administrators to with-
hold the commitment of funds made available in this bill until some of the afore-
mentioned reforms have been accomplished or are in the process of being ac-
complished.
Id. at 6.
For comparison of this new program with "conditions" traditionally involved in govern-
mental foreign aid, see Hirschman, Second Thoughts on the "Alliance for Progress," The
Reporter, May 25, 1961, pp. 20-21; 108 CONG. REc. 13519 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Der-
winski). See acute presentation of the opposing positions on the "pre-conditioning" issue,
plus testimony by administrators that reforms had not actually taken place subsequent to
initiation of the Alliance program, in dialogue between executive official and aid-critic Rep.
Passman, chairman of House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Hearings on Foreign
Appropriations for 1963 Before the House Subcommittee of the CoImittee on Appropria-
tions, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 248-63 (1962) [Hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings].
2. See, e.g., Haar, Latin America's Troubled Cities, 41 FOREIGN AFFAiXS 536 (1963).
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redistribution as the nugget of reform about which Alliance efforts can be
centered. Absent from these critiques has been a recognition of the possible
conflict between economic advances and social desiderata, requiring decision as
to the priorities to be accorded particular types of reform. Since United States
financing will determine the success or failure of Latin American reform pro-
grams, this decision will often be one for United States foreign policy officials.
And once these priorities have been formulated, United States administrators
will have to determine the best method for convincing participating Alliance
countries to enact conforming legislation. An example of the complex prob-
lems involved in the decision to finance is the Chilean land reform bill-a
much battered enactment which issued from the Chilean legislature in the fall
of 1962. 3 Marked by the scars of compromise, it had been scrutinized and re-
viewed prior to passage by a multitude of panels, foreign aid experts in the
United States State Department, economists, and politicians. Not only signif-
icant in its domestic ramifications, the Chilean law also had significant in-
ternational implications: it was the first Latin American land reform legisla-
tion since the establishment in 1961 of the Alliance program.4
Although Chile has a better-developed middle class than most Latin Ameri-
can nations, an extreme disparity of land ownership and wealth is also pres-
ent.' The Chilean Government has described the situation as follows:
The agrarian structure of Chile is characterized in the main by an
abundance of very small holdings and a large concentration of large
estates in the hands of a small number of proprietors ... with the result
that the living standard of the rural population is very low.6
About thirty per cent of Chile's eight million people are engaged in agricultural
work,7 and in the central part of the country, where practically all agricultural
3. Diario Oficial de la Repfiblica de Chile, Nov. 27, 1962, pp. 2501-14 (copy on file in
Yale Law Library).
4. Of the other countries cited by administrators as having "land reform" programs,
none has instituted even its colonization scheme, the most common form listed, since the
initiation of the Alliance program. See 1962 Hearings, pt. 1, at 259.
5. See editorial, N.Y. Times, March 1, 1960, p. 32, col. 1, for view that although Chile
has a right to be called the cradle of Latin American democracy, there exists a current of
distress and social resentment just below the surface, the acute maldistribution of wealth
being perhaps even greater than in any other Latin American country; HANKE, SOUTH
AMERICA 49 (1959); INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION (ICA), LATIN
AMERICAN USOMs SEMINAR ON AGRARIAN REFORMs 102 (150/twDmr/March 1961) ; PIKE,
CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 271-83 (1963). But see J. Zabala, letter to Editor, N.Y.
Times, March 5, 1960. The gap between the rich and the poor in Chile was specifically
referred to in discussion of the Alliance for Progress program in Congress, 107 CoNG. IEc.
16184 (1961) (remarks of Senator Humphrey), and in the Fact Sheet prepared by ad-
ministrators for congressional study, 1961 Hearings 19.
6. U.N. DEPT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRs, PROGRESS IN LAND REFORM 42-43 (U.N. Pub.
Sales No. 1954.II.B.3) (reply to a United Nations questionnaire).
7. INSTITUTO DE Eco NomiA, DESAROLLO EcoNOMIcO DE CHILE 103 (1956).
In 1930, almost two of every five active persons worked in agriculture. Now, this
proportion has descended to less than a third of the active population. Nevertheless,
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production is concentrated, seven per cent of the properties contain over
eighty-nine per cent of the land ;8 over half of the privately owned land in the
area belongs to 375 latifundistas,9 Latin American counterparts of feudal
lords. Consequently, most of the profits from agriculture accrue to a small
number of owners while the people who labor on the land exist at a sub-
sistence level.10 Chile, however, has a serious problem at the other extreme of
farm size as well. Minifundios, uneconomical dwarf holdings incapable of pro-
ducing adequate support for their owners, constitute almost two-thirds of the
total number of properties although occupying only two per cent of the agricul-
tural area."
Repeated efforts had been made prior to 1960 to enact land tenure legislation
that would reduce the egregious discrepancies in land holding. Political factors,
however, made passage of such legislation virtually impossible.' 2 Controlled
in 1952, the total rural percentage of the population was considerably higher than
the percentage of the population occupied directly in the fields, and represented 40%
of the total population, which indicates that the situation of the population dependent
on the rural areas has not changed significantly.
Id. at 5 (tr.). Preliminary data from the 1960 census indicate a probable further drop in
agricultural population-to 28% of the active population, and 34% of total population. CIDA
(Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development), "Inventory of Information
Basic to Agricultural Programs in Latin America" (1963 draft form), pp. 61, 63. For
present total population figure of eight million, see N.Y. Times, April 21, 1963, p. 22, col. 1.
8. CONSIDINE, NEW HoRIZONs IN LATIN AmERICA 128 (1958). Figures given in other
sources vary slightly, but verify the existence of enormous contrast in holdings. See PRO-
GRESS IN LAND REFORM, supra note 6, at 42 (7% of properties in sample area in central
Chile contain 85.9% of farm area; 1.4% of holdings in country as a whole contain 63.2% of
farm area) ; Carroll, Agricultural Development of Central Chile 157-58 (1951 Cornell Ph.D.
thesis) (1.5% of all farms take up 75% of farm land).
9. CoNsIDiNE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 128. See HERRING, A HISTORY OF LATIN AmER-
ICA 607 (1961) (over one-half of all farm land owned by 626 holders).
The following terminology will be employed throughout this paper: latifundia (the
system of large landholdings) ; latifundio (a large, landed estate) ; latifundista (the owner
of a large landed estate). See, e.g., CIDA (Inter-American Committee for Agricultural
Development), Land Tenure Project Outline, p. 12 (July, 1962 Draft). In this sense,
latifundio includes both the hacienda and plantation type of holdings, since "both systems
embody monoply elements, both result in extreme maldistribution of income, and in social
conditions which have often been described as deplorable." Carroll, The Land Reform Issue
in Latin America, LATIN AmERicAx IssuEs, ESSAYS AND COMMENTs 164-65 (Hirschman
ed. 1961).
10. HERRING, op. cit. supra at 608-09; N.Y. Times, April 2, 1961, p. 14, col. 1.
11. Carroll thesis, supra note 8, at 158. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1961, p. 39, col. 1
(statement by United States agricultural officer of foreign aid agency that 85% of Chile's
farmers cultivate 8% of the arable land); POBLETE ToNcoso, EcONoA AGWIxA DE
AmERICA LATINA 57 (1953) (describing production levels and living conditions on Chilean
minifundios).
12. See reply of Chilean Government to United Nations questionnaire with respect to
obstacles to adoption of land reform measures, in PROGRESS IN LAND REFOR, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 43:
Owing to the economic and political structure of the country, land reform in Chile
is difficult to carry out. Landholders who would be affected by any action of an
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by a coalition composed of the center party and two rightist parties,"3 the
Chilean Government was immobilized from action on the issue of property:
the rightist groups, dominated by landowner interests, consistently opposed
strong land reform measures. 14 Fiscal dislocations in the Chilean economy
have posed additional obstacles to land reform. Despite a conscious austerity
program designed to control government expenditures, the government has ex-
perienced an increasing budgetary deficit.15 As a result, cash is not available
to finance a land redistribution program. Moreover, in a violent inflationary
period such as Chile is experiencing,"0 latifundistc resistance to land surrender
increases, since the cash received on redistribution will be of less certain con-
tinuing value than the property transferred. As a result there is a tendency
to withhold land from the market.
In 1960, Chile and the other American nations assembled at Bogota under
the auspices of the Organization of American States.17 The spectre of the re-
cent Cuban crisis, partially responsible for a $500 million authorization of
American funds for the purpose of United States bargaining at the meeting,'8
lent urgency to the conference's deliberation on the necessity of an integrated
program of Latin American regional planning in the economic and social
sphere. The further flowering of a social and economic community was given
outline form in the Act of Bogota, which contained a declaration of principles
and set up the machinery for future international cooperation.' 9 One year later
the same states signed the Charter of Punta del Este, establishing the Alliance
for Progress. The signatory nations were committed to formulate "compre-
hensive and well-conceived national programs of economic and social develop-
ment," whose sufficiency to qualify for recommendation to regional fund
economic, political, administrative, legal or social nature will vigorously oppose its
implementation, and their political and economic influence is very powerful. In spite
of this, the necessary conditions are being created in Chile to initiate a land reform
policy, which will have to be introduced gradually, with due safeguards but with de-
termination.
Land reform measures had been presented to the Chilean Congress for action during every
session for the three years prior to 1961, but no bill had received majority support. See 1962
Hearings, pt. 3, at 139; N.Y. Times, March 5, 1962, p. 5, col. 3.
13. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1961, p.39, col. 1.
14. See N.Y. Times, March 5, 1962, p. 5, col. 3.
15. Cf. The Atlantic Report on Chile, Atlantic, Jan. 1963, p. 2 0.
16. The drastic and unpredictable nature of the rise in Chile's cost of living may be
emphasized by noting that the 1961 rate of 8% was mild in comparison with the 38% of
1959. Ibid.
17. See INTER-AmmEIcAN DEVFLOPMENT BANK, SOCIAL PROGRESS TRUST FUND, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1961) [Hereinafter cited as IADB 1ST ANN. REP.].
18. The relationship between the Cuban crisis of 1960 and congressional approval of
the increased foreign aid to Latin America has often been noted. See, e.g, Hirschman, supra
note 1, at 20; Szulc, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1962, p. 12, col. 2 ("The Alliance for Pro-
gress is seen on the political level as a major challenge to the Communist-backed revolu-
tionary pressures of the Cuban type."). The legislation itself has been referred to as "the
Castro bill." 106 CONG. REc. 18724 (1960).
19. See Act of Bogota, Pan American Union, (1961).
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sources was to be evaluated by a supra-national committee of economic and
social experts.20 Chile, pursuant to her pledge, submitted a broad national pro-
gram for economic and social development in 1961 .21 As a natural consequence
of the intimate nexus between future Chilean social development and her
present land holding pattern, the broad program bore the kernel of the sub-
sequently enacted land reform bill.
In early 1962, the bill, drafted by a committee composed of representatives
of the three parties in the Chilean coalition, was introduced in that country's
legislature.2 2 Its terms were shaped to a considerable extent by the displeasure
which had been voiced with respect to the land tenure aspects of the 1961
Chilean proposal to the Alliance. The first draft provided the Executive with
broad, but discretionary, special decree powers for establishing agencies, stand-
ards, and rules to bring about land reform.23 The parties of the left outside the
coalition, however, were constantly pressing to have stronger, broader laws
enacted faster. The least conservative party in the Government coalition was
sympathetic to this position, in part because of its need to attract popular sup-
port for the upcoming presidential election in 1964.24 Passage of the bill as
originally introduced was blocked in the Senate, which insisted on maintaining
greater legislative control of the program .25 A compromise was reached which
resulted in the elimination of certain provisions from the law and the addition
of a framework of limitations upon the Executive's power.20 In November,
1962, this land reform bill was finally approved.2 7
Articles 1 to 3 of Chilean Law 15.020 (1962) constitute an informal pre-
amble, declaring property rights in landed property to be subject to the limita-
tions required for national economic development and social progress, especial-
ly the obligations imposed by the instant law.28 The purposes of the reform,
20. See text in PAN AMERICAN UNION, ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, OFFICIAL DOCUlMENTS,
CHARTER OF PUNTA DEL ESTE (1961) [Hereinafter cited as CHARTER OF PUNTA DEL
ESTE]. All of the twenty-one nations of the Organization of American States with the
exception of Cuba were signatory nations to the Charter. The Dominican Republic and Cuba
did not sign the earlier Act of BogotA. See 1961 Hearings 21.
21. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1961, p. 3, col. 6. Although begun independently of the
two Alliance conferences, this plan fell within the terms of the requirement of the Charter of
Punta Del Este that participating Latin American countries formulate long-term develop-
ment programs incorporating self-help measures. See CHARTER OF PUNTA DEL ESTE, Title
II, ch. II.
22. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1961, p.39, col. 1.
23. Senate Bull. No. 19943, July 5, 1962, (Chile) ; "Proposal of Law of the House of
Deputies Conceding Extraordinary Powers to the President of the Republic to Realize
an Agrarian Reform."
24. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1961, p. 9, col. 1; id., Dec. 18, 1961, p. 19, col. 8.
25. Letter from Director of U.N. F.A.O. Mission, Santiago, Chile, to the Yale Law
Journal, Oct. 29, 1962, on file in Yale Law Library.
26. Ibid.; N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 25, col. 1.
27. Law Number 15.020, Agrarian Reform, printed in full in Diario Oficial de la Re-
pilblica de Chile, Nov. 27, 1962, pp. 2501-14 (copy on file in Yale Law Library). [Here-
inafter particular articles of this statute are cited simply as Article.]
28. Article 1.
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phrased virtually in terms of the goals set forth in the Alliance charter, are
proclaimed to be improving the rural population's standard of living, in-
creasing agricultural production, and giving landownership opportunities to
those who work the land.29 To this end, the elaborate, 104-article statute2 0
establishes an Agrarian Reform Corporation 31 and a Supreme Council of
Agricultural Development 32 to promote the rational division of rural land, and
specifies rules concerning their operation. Although much emphasis is placed
upon development through improvement of technical assistance programs and
transportation, market, and credit facilities, some provision is made for dealing
with basic tenure problems.
One facet of the statute is aimed at redistribution in terms of the inini-
fundios. To alleviate the undesirable economic and living conditions created by
these excessively small farms,33 provision is made for their consolidation 2 4
and for redistribution of the land in parcels constituting "economic units."3 "
While there was little political opposition to such an attack upon the prob-
lems of miinifundia, conservative elements severely limited the measures that
could be used against the latifutndios.26 In the first place, properties already
held by the government must be used first in supplying land to the presently
landless. Furthermore, when latifundios are required for redistribution, the
preferred methods of acquisition are declared to be public auction or direct
purchase from the owner.37 If purchase is made at auction, the government
is permitted to make full payment in cash, but if property is bought directly
from the owner, there is a cash expenditure limitation of twenty per cent of the
purchase price; the remainder must be paid at a fixed rate in equal annual in-
stallments over a period of at least ten years.3 8 Outright expropriation as a
method for acquisition is severely restricted. A two-thirds vote of the Council
of the Agrarian Reform Corporation meeting in special session is a prere-
quisite.3 9 And even with this authorization, only certain latifundios (statu-
torily defined for this purpose as properties of more than twenty economic
units in value) can be subjected to expropriation. The first broad category of
29. Article 3.
30. See Carroll, supra note 9, at 198, for a discussion of the preoccupation with "legal-
ism" in all land reform programs, a preoccupation which takes the form of long, compli-
cated, and detailed statutes making implementation or amendment difficult.
31. Article 11.
32. Article 4.
33. See note 11 supra.
34. Article 11 (f).
35. Article 11 (b).
36. The National Agricultural Organization, a group composed of latifundistas, has
wielded great influence over agricultural policy and reform measures. See ICA, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 105.
37. Article 11 (a).
38. Ibid.
39. Article 21. An extremely limited exception to this requirement allows the expro-
priation to be decreed by the President of the Republic in the case of certain properties
within the jurisdiction of the law of coastal properties or planted to Auracarian pine. Ibid.
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vulnerable landholding includes the following: abandoned property, or property
that is extremely poorly exploited; half of any property irrigated through
Government-built systems; lands being sold at public auction because of the
insolvency of the owner; certain lands belonging to absentee owners; marshy
properties. 40 This list obviously does not reach the bulk of latifundios within
the country, and it appears that the implementing Executive decrees, by
dropping the "poorly exploited" category, 41 may have eliminated the one point
at which administrative expansion could have occurred. Any program of
expropriation, therefore, will have to be concerned primarily with latifundios
of the second basic permitted category. 42 These are lands that are included by
the Supreme Council of Agricultural Development in a Regional Development
Plan. This hinges the success of an expropriation program on the vigor with
which such plans are developed. Even if sufficient lands become subject to this
form of acquisition, however, a financial barrier remains, since the reform law
stipulates that full cash payment must be made for expropriated land.43
Thus arises the problem of procuring funds to finance reform which plagues
each development program. Of course, the government might look to private
financing. Civilian investors will not require a program to lead toward realiza-
tion of any particular social goal, such as economic independence of the small
landowner, so long as the profit rate, their primary concern, is sufficient. Such
investors, however, will not be attracted to the unprofitable but basic in-
frastructure investment which must precede more commercial ventures. In
countries such as Chile, which suffer chronically from a shortage of investment
capital, the availability of funds to be raised internally, through exercise of
the taxing power, is also severely limited.44 Consequently, the government
must place prime reliance on financing from external sources, funneled through
either official regional conduits or ordinary channels of foreign aid. The vast
bulk of these funds emanates at present from the United States.40 Roughly
two-fifths of the first billion American dollars made available to participating
40. Article 15.
41. Pan American Union, The Alliance for Progress Weekly Report, No. 30, March
25, 1963, p. 20 .
42. Article 16.
43. Article 31.
44. CHARTER OF PUINTA DEL EsT , Title II, ch. IV, sec. 1:
The economic and social development of Latin America will require a large amount
of additional public and private financial assistance on the part of capital-exporting
countries, including the members of the Development Assistance Group and inter-
national lending agencies. The measures provided for in the Act of Bogoti and the
new measures provided for in this Charter, are designed to create a framework within
which such additional assistance can be provided and effectively utilized.
45. See "Progress of the Alliance," Americas, June, 1962, p. 3. Despite the fact that the
Alliance program is based upon anticipated United States government grants and loans to
Latin America of one billion dollars annually, this sum is only 20% of the amount considered
essential for projected goals. But until private investors in Latin America or abroad can be
induced to participate, United States funds remain the key catalytic agent. See RAusHEN-
BUsH, THE CHALLNGE TO THE ALLiAwCE FOR PaoGanss 29, 42 (1962).
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Latin American countries was to be administered through an explicitly re-
gional authority, the Social Progress Trust Fund.46 The remainder has been
allocated for unilateral administration, in general accord with Alliance princi-
ples, by American foreign aid officials, through the Agency for International
Development.
47
The apparent availability of such large amounts of aid does not lead im-
mediately to the conclusion that monetary problems have been resolved; to a
considerable degree, pressures of American domestic politics as well as re-
quirements of Alliance principles complicate the process of obtaining funds.
The United States controls not only the disposition of AID funds, which may
be conditioned upon fulfillment of stated requirements, but also, through use of
a veto power, the disbursements of the Social Progress Trust Fund.48 Both
programs are severely hampered in the aid they can extend to land purchase
programs. The Social Progress Trust Fund is explicitly barred from al-
locating funds for the purchase of agricultural land;49 although statutory
language is not explicit for AID programs, Congressional resistance to such
use, 0 current AID emphasis on support of discrete projects rather than
broad reform programs,6 ' and Latin American sensitivities 52 make it likely
that the same inhibition will exist in practice. Of course, to the extent that
dollars flow to Chile for approved purposes, which may include the agricultural
improvement measures also provided for by the Chilean statute, Chilean
funds which could otherwise have been devoted to these projects will be re-
leased. Although Chile may not have the financial resources to make this "re-
leased fund" fungibiity effect complete, it would appear that a substantial
amount of cash for land purchase purposes could become available in this
manner.
53
As important as the question of direct availability of funds for land pur-
chase programs is the fact that the question of financing does not arise in the
isolated context of a land tenure reform program. All requests for financing,
46. Of the original $500 million appropriated by Congress for the Alliance program,
$394 million was given to the Inter-American Development Bank as Administrator of this
Fund. See 1961 Hearings at 94. The following year, $600 million was appropriated but not
assigned to the Fund. 1962 Hearings, pt. 1, at 248-49.
47. 1962 Hearings at 250.
48. Because a two-thirds vote of the executive directors is necessary to make specific
loans, the United States representative-casting over 40% of the votes on the basis of
capital contributed to the Bank-has the ability to block proposed loans judged not in har-
mony with the Act of BogotA. See 1961 Hearings at 23.
49. Art. I, sec. 1.04(a) of Social Progress Trust Fund Agreement. See 1961 Hearings
at 58; IADB, 1sT ANN. REPORT, supra note 17 at 3.
50. See, e.g., 106 CONG. REc. 16842 (1960).
51. See 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at 64, 75.
52. See note 106 infra.
53. Only to the extent that United States dollars are used for programs that would
otherwise have been undertaken in the recipient country will additional funds be released
and be available for use in land acquisition. If political pressure for reform is great, therefore,
it may matter little whether the United States stipulates that funds must be used for land
purchase or complementary projects.
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whether to the Fund or to AID, will be measured by the overall aims of the
Alliance; all decisions to finance will be influenced to some degree by the de-
cisions of regional experts as well as American administrators. Thus, the
Charter of Punta del Este has established a panel of nine economic planning
advisors, 54 mostly citizens of Latin American countries, whose function is to
review proposals in terms of the principles and obligations of the Charter, to
"exchange opinions with the interested government as to possible modifica-
tions," and, if the consent of the subject government is given, to report its
conclusions to external financing agencies such as the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and the United States government.5"
The constellation of American and regional experts, administrators and Al-
liance for Progress officials suggests a pattern of interaction between partici-
pating countries and regional agencies which bears analysis for its significance
to future aid programs. Evaluation of the Chilean law may cast light on the
standards which American administrators are currently employing in making
the decision of financing vel non, and on the ability of American and regional
planners to secure compliance with desired reform programs in Alliance na-
tions. Admittedly, the viewpoint of such administrators would be colored by
the priority position they assign to land tenure reform in the spectrum of
Alliance goals. Before reaching the question of priority, however, it may be
more convenient to draw certain conclusions regarding the future of the
Chilean land reform program as enacted.
Assuming effective administration, the provisions of the Chilean land reform
dealing with conditions of minifundia would appear to be the most promising 0
These excessively small plots are to be regrouped and redistributed in parcels
constituting "economic units," with preference among recipients to be given to
former occupants. 57 The new units are to vary in size according to quality of
soil, location, climate, and other characteristics considered to be proper criteria
for determining the amount of land necessary to provide reasonable support
for a family group.58 For the benefit of these new owners, as well as for other
small property owners, the statute provides for increased technical assistance
and for the transportation, market, and credit facilities essential to the satis-
factory operation of their holdings.59
Another clear benefit of the statute is the opportunity it provides for the
creation of new, viable landholdings through fragmentation of large tracts.
54. CHARTER OF PUNTA DEL ESTE, Title II, ch. V.
55. Ibid.
56. See 108 CONG. REc. 2608 (1962) ; see notes 11, 34-35 supra. For a discussion of
previous Chilean attempts to deal with the ininifundia problem, see generally MORAL-LOPEZ
& JACOBY, PRINCIPLES OF LAND CONSOLIDATION LEGISLATION (F.A.O. Legis. Series No. 3)
(1962).
57. Article 11 (f).
58. Article 11 (b).
59. Article 5(a). Ten million dollars had already been authorized as a loan from the
Social Progress Trust Fund for this type of program in Chile. IADB, 2d ANN. REP. 112
(1961).
[Vol. 73 : 310
THE CHILEAN LAND REFORM
Administrators contemplate the creation of 15,000 such farms per year, a
marked increase from the present rate of 5,000 per year.60 But such a rate,
while an improvement, must be considered insufficient to relieve the pressure
for land ownership created by the existence of an underprivileged rural popu-
lation of nearly two million.61 And the priority emphasis on redistributing
government-owned lands is likely to decrease the speed with which new "eco-
nomic units" might be created. Previous experience in Chile has demonstrated
that the process of making these generally undeveloped lands habitable and
productive is slow and expensive. 62 Furthermore, only eight per cent of the
land currently owned by the government is considered suitable for agricultural
development, and any reasonably effective redistribution program would ex-
haust this supply within a year.63
Therefore, it is privately owned land that must be the primary source of
supply for a redistribution program. Yet it would not be difficult to conclude
that shortcomings in the statute-for example, lack of any provision setting a
maximum size of farms 64 -will prevent an effective attack upon the system of
latifundia. The lack of statutory emphasis upon redistribution of latiflundios
might have been cured through dynamic administration, 65 but even here there
seems to be advance hamstringing through specific restrictions on the exercise
60. Pan American Union, The Alliance for Progress Weekly Report, No. 25, Feb. 18,
1963, p. 21; N.Y. Times, April 21, 1963, p. 22, col. 1.
61. See INTERNATIONAL COOPsERATION ADMINISTRATION [hereinafter cited as ICA],
LATIN AMERICAN USOMs SEMINAR ox AGRARIAN REFORM 103 (1961) ; N.Y. Times, April
21, 1963, p. 22, col. 1 (statement by leader of opposition in Chile).
62. See Carroll, supra note 9, at 189; ELLSWORTH, CHILE:: AN ECONOMY IN TRANSI-
TION 156-57 (1945); FIGUERA, LExISLACION SODME COLONIZACIoN 33-49 (1943); INTER-
AMERICAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE AGRICULTURAL EcoNoMY
OF CHILE 35-36 (1952) (in the first 24 years of the major program, only 82 holdings were
created, and progress virtually stopped after 1940).
See ICA, op. cit. supra note 61, at 44: "Large areas of Latin America remain in unde-
veloped state ownership.... Generally speaking the areas left in public ownership are those
which could not be profitably used for one reason or another."
See Carroll, supra note 9, at 197; Better Deal for Small Farmers, Business Week, May
12, 1962, pp. 66-68.
63. Only 900,000 hectares of government lands are agricultural lands. Thus even if
units of only 50 hectares were created, there could be only 18,000 new farms, and not all of
these would be well-located. Much of the land currently being distributed is forest land and
pasture land. See ICA, op. cit. mipra note 61, at 25 and 104.
64. But the view that maximum limits on land holdings are likely to be an effective
means of implementing land reform has been seriously questioned in light of the Puerto
Rican experience with the "500 Acre Law" (Joint Res. No. 23, S.R. 116, May 1, 1900), which
has been in effect, but unenforced, since enactment. See Rosenn, Piterto Rican Land Re-
form: The History of an Instructive Experiment, 73 YALE L.J. 334 (1963).
65. An apparently mild land reform law in. Colombia has been made remarkably effec-
tive through vigorous implementation since its passage in 1961, in a process described by
one observer as "revolution by stealth." Hirschman, "The Problem of Land Tenure and
Land Reform in Colombia," July 1962 (chapter in as yet unpublished study for Twentieth
Century Fund).
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of administrative discretion. Thus, the limitations which require reliance upon
public auction and direct purchase as the methods to be used in acquiring
latifundios for redistribution,"6 seem unsatisfactory substitutes for outright
expropriation. Moreover, despite an increased availability of speculative land-
holdings in rural areas in the past several years, the limiting factor of lack of
funds will prevent the government from fully utilizing this source of supply. 7
And though provision for mandatory deferment of payment in cases of direct
purchase 6 8 might seem useful as a means of easing the immediate cash burden
on the government, that method may be viewed as having the anti-reform ef-
fect of discouraging sales at reasonable prices. Owners will demand higher
prices for their property when dealing with the government, to compensate
them for the cost of compelled financing of the transaction since the four per
cent interest rate is totally unrealistic in view of Chile's drastic and unpre-
dictable rate of inflation."9 Although some protection against an inflation-
caused loss of purchasing power may be provided through annual payment
made on the basis of a general price index,70 the exact nature of these read-
justments has not been made clear, and sellers will certainly be skeptical about
their efficacy.
The payment provisions seem to thwart further the use of expropriation
where that device is permitted since full cash payment is to be made within one
year of condemnation.71 Deferred payment would be useful in easing the finan-
cial burdens of the program where the price paid and value maintenance terms
could be easily controlled by the government. 72 The original bill provided for
twenty per cent of expropriation compensation for certain properties to be paid
66. See text at notes 37-43 supra.
67. See PIKE, CHME AND THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1962 282 (1963).
68. See text at note 38 supra.
69. See notes 15-16 supra.
70. Article 11 (a).
71. See note 43 supra.
72. Payment in the form of bonds has been the most frequently used method of com-
pensation in land reform programs in the past. In this manner the burden of compensating
the expropriated owners may be spread over a period of years. Problems of Financing Land
Distribution, in LAND TENURE 492 (Parsons, Penn, & Raup, ed. 1956). Such deferred pay-
ment in effect requires the latifundistas to lend to the government, at a statutorily set rate
of interest, the money with which to by their land. Ibid.; ORGANIZATION OF AamCAN
STATES (OAS), AGRARIAN REFORM 33 (OEA/Ser.H/X.1) (1961).
Since unpredictable rates of inflation would have a great effect upon the final total re-
turn to the expropriated owner, a possible compromise is to employ value maintenance bonds
with payments based upon an index of general prices or of certain agricultural products for
which a market price is readily ascertainable. This device would preserve for the landowner
the purchasing power of cash payment although actual payment is deferred.
See Problems of Financing Land Redistribution, supra, at 496; ICA, op. cit. .npra note
61, at 22; INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR REcONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE AGRIcuL-
TURAL ECONOMY OF CHILE 36 (1952) [hereinafter cited as U.N. EcoSoc Couxcm]. Com-
modity bonds to avoid bond value erosion were used in the Taiwan land reform program,
frequently cited as exemplary. Address by Lester D. Mallory, The Land Problem in the
Americas, 43 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 815, 821 (1960).
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in cash, with the remainder being paid in equal semi-annual installments over a
period of ten years; yet doubt had been expressed that the government could
obtain sufficient funds to make even the down payments under this approach.7 3
Nevertheless, neither this provision nor a proposed corollary constitutional
amendment modifying the requirement of cash payments for expropriated
property survived the legislative gauntlet.74 Because of current budgetary limi-
tations, this failure to provide for deferred payment will seriously curtail the
practicality of using expropriation to acquire even those few properties that
can legally be expropriated for redistributive purposes.7 5
In view of these weaknesses in the land reform bill, the attitude of United
States administrators and other regional planners toward further financing of
Chilean economic and social development will depend to a large extent upon
the relative priority given to land tenure reform in evaluating performance by
participating Latin American countries. This question of priorities becomes
most difficult in those situations where the social goal of land tenure reform
conflicts with progress on economic fronts. Economies of large-scale farming,
for example, might be lost as a result of splitting latifundios into family-size
farms; central government decisions, moreover, regarding production limits or
crop diversification goals might be more difficult to implement. Furthermore,
the possibility of future loss of landholdings might deter investment and de-
velopment of land held by owners whose property is not taken in the first
limited round of a redistribution program.76 The possibility of such a conflict
was raised in the Act of Bogota, which acknowledged that limitations on land
reform might be desirable by providing that land tenure legislation seeking
more equitable distribution of ownership should only be encouraged "in a
manner consistent with the objectives of employment, productivity and eco-
nomic growth."'7 7 But a basic assumption of the Alliance is that land reform
73. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1962, p. 9, col. 3.
74. Letter from Director of U.N. F.A.O. Mission, Santiago, Chile, to the Yale Law
Journal, Nov., 1962, on file in Yale Law Library. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1961, p. 39,
col. 1.
75. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 25, col. 1. The country's limited revenues have
made a tight budget policy necessary, but deficits have persisted despite a conscious austerity
program. ICA, op. cit. supra note 61, at 105.
76. The Influence of Land Reform on Agricultural Production, in LAND TENURE, Op.
cit. supra note 72, at 577 (problem of splitting latifundios). Cf. Flores, Agrarian Reform
and Economic Development, in LAND TENURE, op. cit. supra note 72, at 245.
77. Pan American Union, Act of Bogoti 3 (1961) (Article I.A.l.a.). Both land reform
measures and the Alliance program in general acknowledge land tenure reform as a social
goal, even if short-run economic effects of the reform are adverse. RAUSHENBUSH, op. Cit.
supra note 45, at 31; THEOBALD, THE RicH AND THE POOR 44 (1961) ; ICA, op. cit. supra
note 61, at 9-10 ("Considerations that lead to land redistribution have the common objec-
tive of bringing about an improvement in the rural social structure. They may or may not
lead to an increase in overall productivity of the land.").
The clearest expression of this distinction appears in the testimony of Lincoln Gordon,
Consultant, President's Task Force on Latin America, and George Ball, Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs, Department of State, 1961 Hearings 72-73. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the economic phenomenon in more developed countries of a trend toward larger
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measures are essential or complementary to the accomplishment of other de-
sired economic goals. To a large extent, this interrelationship of social and
economic goals clearly exists. Tenure reform, i.e., redistribution, does not exist
as an isolated goal. Land reform-the generic category-postulates the ne-
cessity for a wide variety of production-increasing techniques such as market
and credit development, soil improvement, and road building.78 Even by itself,
however, more equitable distribution of land ownership 70 may have desirable
economic effects. The advocates of land tenure reform argue that such
measures are necessary to enlarge the market of consumers, creating more
effective demand for goods to be produced in a developing commercial econo-
my. And the use of more labor-intensive techniques which is likely to ac-
company tiller-owner division of the land is desirable in underdeveloped areas
where capital is a scarce factor and labor abundant.80
The important role of land tenure reform may also be stated in terms of
its social welfare effects. The grand design of the Alliance for Progress is to
improve the living standards of the peoples of Latin America.8 ' But if the
present radically uneven distribution of land were to be left unaltered,82 the
farm units does not indicate that this should also be the case where labor is abundant and
capital scarce. In such countries, a family-scale operation is probably preferable. See U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRARIAN REFORM & EcONomcIc GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 30-31
(March 1962).
78. In United Nations debates and studies, for example, the term refers to programs and
techniques more broadly characterized as "agrarian reform." U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL, op.
cit. supra note 72, at 8.
79. See SENIOR, LAND REFORTM AND DEMOCRAcY at vi, 7 (1958) ; ICA, op. cit. supra
note 62, at 8; Carroll, "The Land Reform Issue in Latin America," LATIN AmERICAN
ISSUES, ESSAYS, AND COMMENTS 196-200 (Hirschman ed. 1961).
The concept of land reform is itself a controversial and semantically intriguing topic.
Its narrowest and traditional meaning confines it to land distribution. A broader view
includes in it other related changes in agricultural institutions, such as credit, taxa-
tion, rents, cooperatives, etc. The widest interpretation makes land reform practically
synonymous with all agricultural improvement measures-better seeds, price policies,
irrigation, research, mechanization, etc. The writer is of the opinion that land tenure
is the central problem in land reform....
Carroll, supra at 162 n.1.
80. See ICA, op. cit. supra note 61, at 31; PARSONS, THE OWNER CULTIVATOR IN A
PROGRESSIVE AGRICULTURE 32 (1958) (FAO Agric. Studies No. 39).
81. See the opening words of the "Declaration to the Peoples of America," which ac-
companied the Charter of Punta Del Este. PAN AMERICAN UNION, ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS
1 (OEA/Ser.H/XII.1) (1961).
82. Historically based upon a system of large land grants, land ownership patterns in
Latin America today exist as a monopoly of agricultural resources. For a description of the
history of land tenure patterns in Latin America as compared with the United States tradi-
tion of owner-tiller farms, see Mallory, supra note 72, at 818-19. That ownership of roughly
85% of all land is held by 5% of the population demonstrates the extent of this concentrated
ownership, or latifundia. Landownership figures vary somewhat from source to source, but
within a relatively small range. E.g., RAUSHENBUSH, op. cit. vupra note 46, at 32 (1.5% of
the farming population owns 65% of the farm land; 9.5% owns 88%). See chart in LAND
AND LIBERTY, A VIsIoN REPORT 7 (1962).
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benefits of United States assistance to the agricultural sector would accrue
primarily to large landholders rather than to those individuals and families
who work the land. s3 Moreover, land reform measures are directed equally at
the redistribution of future wealth-the opportunity to share in benefits to be
generated by the Alliance. 84 To the extent that future Alliance funds are
channelled through agricultural interests, reallocation of the land means a
fundamental change in the roster of recipients of Alliance largesse.8 5 Thus
even if owners of latifundios receive full payment now for their property, as
non-owners they will not participate in subsequent rises in the earning power
of the land resulting from United States investment and development pro-
jects."0 New owners of the land will also have an incentive to work harder,
since they will no longer be forced to share the product of their toil with their
old landlords.87 Furthermore, political reality renders land redistribution a
goal independent of its repercussions on present wealth-equalization. By pro-
viding farms for the masses who work the land, aspirations generated by the
83. At present, a small minority of the rural population is able to live opulently, while
the vast majority exists at subsistence level as either tenant farmers or farm laborers. See
RAUSHExiBUSH, op. cit. supra note 45, at 32. President Kennedy has emphasized this fact as
a reason for demanding redistribution as a condition precedent to assistance. See Kennedy
Message to Congress, 44 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 474, 475-77 (1961); Address by Teodoro
Moscoso, Alliance for Progress Press Release A-17, April 18, 1962 ("We would rather
withhold our assistance than to participate in the maintenance of a status-quo characterized
by social injustice.")
84. See THOSALD, Op. cit. supra note 77, at 29, 133. The rationale for emphasizing
redistributive reform was expressed by President Kennedy when he stated his conception
of the Alliance in seeking appropriations for the program: "[I]f funds for improving
land usage are to be used effectively they should go only to those nations in which the
benefits will accrue to the great mass of rural workers." Message of President Kennedy to
Congress, supra note 83, at 476. The previous day he had addressed the assembled repre-
sentatives of the Latin American countries at the White House and proposed his Alliance,
urging them to ".... . modify their social patterns so that all, and not just a privileged few,
share in the fruits of growth." N.Y. Times, March 14, 1961, p. 1, col. 8.
The 1960 Act of Bogoti, the original documentary basis of the Alliance, listed land
tenure legislation as a likely measure for a program of social development in Latin America.
43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 537, 538 (1960). It should be noted that this recommendation ap-
peared first among the various measures proposed to the Council of the Organization of
American States, indicating the primary role envisaged for land reform by the Committee of
21 American States, and especially the United States delegation, whose draft of the docu-
ment was adopted. See 1961 Hearings 11-12. See also the "Declaration" at the Punta del
Este Conference a year later. Pan American Union, supra note 81, at 3.
85. Latin American economies are basically agricultural in nature. Over 50% of the
population in Latin America is dependent on employment in the agricultural sector for
its livelihood. ICA, op. cit. supra note 61, at 41; LAND AND LIBERTY, op. cit. supra note 82,
at 1-3. Because of this fact, United States assistance has been pledged in large part to sup-
port measures to benefit this sector. In the Fact Sheet on the Alliance program prepared by
administrators for congressional perusal, agricultural production and rural living programs
were given high priority. See 1961 Hearings 19.
86. See ICA, op. cit. spra note 62, at 68-69, for specific examples of projects relating
to land development programs. See also Address by Teodoro Moscoso, quoted in RAUSHEN-
lUSr, op. cit. supra note 45, at 38.
87. See THEo0ALD, op. cit. supra note 77, at 44; PARsoNs, op. cit. supra note 80, at 62-63.
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much-publicized "revolution of rising expectations"88s may be satisfied and
Communist efforts to exploit these same desires balked.80 Given the current
hemispheric situation, a sense of urgency may dominate consideration of what
land reform provisions are to be favored in implementing the aims of the
Alliance.90 Thus, aid in passage of reform legislation may be expected from
the conservative landowning class in some cases. Their fears that redistribu-
tion will wreak havoc in the existing social structure may well be outweighed
by political apprehensions-the threat of violent revolution followed by com-
munization of their properties. 91
Even if United States administrators, as national planners, recognize the
beneficial political, social, and economic consequences which flow from land
reform, still it is clear that they must also function within the prescribed course
of congressional expectations regarding the role of the State Department in
the administration of the foreign aid program. Because of the difficult pass in
which foreign aid officials often find themselves as a result of congressional
criticism of their activities,92 legislative guidelines should be examined before
a final determination is made on the issue of the priority status of land reform
as an Alliance goal. Representatives of the Agency for International Develop-
ment appearing before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Ap-
propriations in 1962 were reminded that their earlier testimony regarding land
reform measures had been relied upon in providing funds for the program. 3
88. See THEOBALD, op. cit. supra note 77, at 29-37; Address by Teodoro Moscoso, Al-
liance for Progress Press Release A-42, June 8, 1962. Speech by Secretary Dillon at
Punta del Este Conference, quoted at 107 CONG. PEc. 15751 (1961) : "We welcome the
revolution of rising expectations among our [American] peoples, and we intend to transform
it into a revolution of rising satisfactions."
89. "The answer to communism in these [South American] countries is a vigorous
program of social reform. Without this reform being put into action the door is left open,
for the Communists to move in and take over... ." 108 CONG. REc. 4038 (1962) (remarks of
Senator Humphrey). See note 18 supra.
90. See generally, RAuSHENBUSH, op. cit. supra note 45, at 14-19; Address by Teodoro
Moscoso, Alliance for Progress Press Release A-42, June 8, 1962; see note 5 supra.
91. Better Deal for Small Farmners, supra note 62, at 64. Cf. McBRME, CHEHr : LAND
AND Soci-ry 374-75 (1936). The entire framework of the Alliance program rests on the
underlying assumption that the landowning groups either will be willing to cooperate in
efforts to achieve progress or can be induced to so cooperate.
92. There is a built-in tension between the executive, charged with the responsibility of
developing foreign policy, and the legislature, which must provide funds for this activity.
Although in the sector of foreign affairs, the President "proposes," the Congress "disposes,"
and "can limit and reduce funds and be downright ingenious in the way it attaches strings
to the money it provides." Koenig, The Presidency: Foreign Aid to Spain and Yugoslavia,
THE USES OF PoWER 79 (Westin ed. 1962). Serious problems have been posed in the past
due to the unwillingness of foreign aid administrators to be bound by legislative directives
imposed at the authorization or appropriation level. See Koenig, supra; Clubb & Vance,
Incentives to Private U.S. Investment Abroad Under the Foreign Assistance Program, 72
YArx L.J. 475 (1963) ; 107 CONG. REc. 15865 (1961).
93. 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at 146. Assurances had also been made to the same effect on
the floor of Congress. Id. at 144-46. See Hanson, The Alliance for Progress-The First
Year: Economic, Inter-American Economic Affairs, Summer 1962, p. 9.
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Furthermore, though speaking partially to quiet political attacks, the Alliance's
Director, Teodoro Moscoso, has recognized that:
The people of the United States are not prepared to support a large scale
effort which they think will result in the perpetuation of social and eco-
nomic systems that are structured so as to benefit the few to the detriment
of the many. However, our people will gladly support that effort through
public and private means for the sake of advancing social justice in
Latin America. That is precisely why we are insisting on reforms as a
condition of our material support to Latin America. We would rather
withhold our assistance than to participate in the maintenance of a status-
quo characterized by social injustice.94
Congressional discussion related in large part to the Punta del Este concep-
tion of land tenure reform as an independent social goal not to be limited be-
cause of possible conflict with a country's general economic growth program.
The Charter lists as a primary objective of the Alliance for Progress the agree-
ment of the American republics to work:
To encourage, in accordance with the characteristics of each country, pro-
grams of comprehensive agrarian reform leading to the effective trans-
formation, where required, of unjust structures and systems of land ten-
ure and use, with a view to replacing latifundia and dwarf holdings by
an equitable system of land tenure so that, with the help of timely and
adequate credit, technical assistance and facilities for the marketing and
distribution of products, the land will become for the man who works it
the basis of his economic stability, the foundation of his increasing wel-
fare, and the guarantee of his freedom and dignity.95
And the United States authorization legislation itself adopted the approach of
awarding priority to land reform measures. Title VI of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1962, the section dealing with the Alliance for Progress, directed the
President to take into account "the principles of the Act of Bogoti and the
Charter of Punta del Este" in furnishing assistance under that title, and more
specifically,
assist in fostering measures of agrarian reform, including colonization
and redistribution of land, with a view to insuring a wider and more
equitable distribution of the ownership of land.96
Assuming, then, that an evaluation of social and economic progress should
emphasize the role land reform must play in the accomplishment of Alliance
goals, serious problems remain-as the Chilean experience indicates-with
respect to the methods by which United States and regional administrators
can secure an approximate reflection of the priorities in programs legislated in
Latin American countries. In the case of Chile, there was a positive attempt to
harmonize prospective legislation with Alliance regional goals and American
expectations. Early in 1962, six months after the Charter of Punta del Este
had been signed, the economic and social development program which Chile
94. Address by Teodoro Moscoso, Alliance for Progress Press Release A-17, April 18,
1962.
95. CHARTER OF PurrA DmL EsTE, Title I, sec. 6.
96. 76 Stat. 257 (1962), 22 U.S.C. § 2211 (1958).
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had developed was submitted to the panel of economic planning advisors estab-
lished by the Charter.97 The Chilean program was judged unsatisfactory, espe-
cially the portion relating to land reform.9 As a consequence of this inter-
mediate, pre-legislative disapprobation, United States aid to Chile might have
been suspended, since the Charter of Punta del Este provides that external
assistance is to be given "those participating countries whose development
programs establish self-help measures and economic and social policies con-
sistent with the principles of the Charter." 9 In addition to this storm-warn-
ing of possible defects from the panel, moreover, AID administrators personal-
ly consulted with the Chilean Government before the bill was passed. A group
of United States officials, led by Mr. Moscoso, visited Chile in March, 1962,
for the purpose of discussing the Alliance with Chilean officials and stressing
the importance of tax and land reforms. 0 0 Reference was made to the im-
pending land tenure legislation, and members of some Chilean parties sought
to persuade the delegation to exert even more pressure on Government leaders
for stronger measures than appeared to be forthcoming. Public assurances of
good intentions and cooperation emanated from these conferences as a result
of the interplay between negotiators,10 1 and in addition there allegedly was
signed, for the purpose of providing United States representatives with con-
crete evidence of aid strings to show to Congress, a not-so-secret secret agree-
ment specifically pledging adherence to the Alliance provisions. 10 2
In a sense these prophylactic measures may be said to have failed. Despite
the panel's reservations and the American touring party's exhortations, the
resultant legislation, judged by the assumed emphasis on land reform achieve-
ment, seems to have compromised too much. What alternative devices might
have been available to regional advisors to encourage closer approximation to
regional goals? Arguably, in the intensive political atmosphere surrounding the
issue of land reform, it might be possible for the regional administrators and
the United States State Department to select sympathetic party factions and
provide them with financial and political support. In Chile, the Radical Party,
least conservative of the three Government coalition parties, had advocated
stronger reform measures, and it is possible that a promise of increased United
States assistance if that program is put into effect will generate increased sup-
port for that party.10 3 Alliance reforms have already been the central issue in
97. See text at notes 55-56 supra.
98. 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at 69.
99. CHARTER OF PUNTA DEL ESTE, Title II, ch. IV.
100. See N.Y. Times, March 5, 1962, p. 1, col. 6 and March 8, 1962, p. 9, col. 3.
101. See N.Y. Times, March 9, 1962, p. 10, col. 3.
102. Moscoso, when questioned by a committee of Congress concerning the lag in re-
form in Chile, referred to this agreement to justify the extension of grants and loans to
that country during the first year of the Alliance. See 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at 142-43
(emphasizing the fact that in the case of Chile specific commitments had been obtained with
regard to reform measures). N.Y. Times, March 12, 1962, p. 12, col. 1 ("Although it was not
spelled out in the communique, the United States commitment is highly conditional.").
103. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 3 1961, p. 9, col. 1. The recent rise to prominence of an-
other center party, somewhat to the left of the Radicals, increases the potential effective-
ness of this approach. See N.Y. Times, April 9, 1963, p. 16, col. 5.
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several Latin American elections. 0 4 As the Assistant Secretary of State in the
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs has testified:
Among the central political objectives of the Alliance for Progress is the
unification of popular support behind those parties which-by establishing
constructive programs and clearly defined goals, by representing the
aspirations and the will of the majority, and by conducting themselves
with a high sense of responsibility-provide leadership and inspire con-
fidence in the future of their countries.
0 5
But the best manner to manifest such factional favoritism is extraordinarily
problematical; if support is visible, there is likely to be an unfavorable reac-
tion to "the candidate (or program) the Yankee Ambassador likes."' 0 6 On the
other hand, these weaknesses might not be present were a purportedly neutral
campaign developed, directed at voters, popularizing the image of the Alliance
as a partnership and emphasizing the value of supporting national leaders
who favor basic reforms to qualify the country for economic assistance.
10 7
Such a selling campaign could be developed through expansion of a similar
program now being conducted by the Organization of American States, re-
ducing the possible stigma which might arise from unilateral United States
backing.'0 8
Absent the viability of effective political persuasion through appeal to voters,
the administrators and regional planners will undoubtedly find it necessary to
resort to sanctions grounded in economic threat: the curtailment or condition-
ing of funds. It is, in fact, principally in this manner that supranational goals
can be achieved in a loose association such as the Alliance for Progress.10 9
104. See text of President Kennedy's Foreign Aid Message to Congress, N.Y. Times,
March 14, 1962, p. 4, col. 4.
105. 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at 13 (emphasis added).
106. The psychological strain caused by having to rely on a foreign government to
push for social progress measures may lead nationalistic leaders to oppose measures favored
by the United States for the very reason that such support has been indicated. See Hirsch-
man, Second Thoughts on the Alliance for Progress, The Reporter, May 25, 1961, pp. 20, 21-
22. Xenophobic fears aroused by the fact that "strings" are attached to the foreign aid are
likely to be exploited by defenders of the status quo within the recipient country as a means of
preserving their own positions, and this is especially true of the case where it is land reform
which is being sought. See Morgenthau, A Political Theory of Foreign Aid, Political
Science Rev. June, 1962 quoted in full at 108 CONG. REc. 14332 (1962).
107. See memorandum from the Director of the International Cooperation Adminis-
tration (United States foreign aid agency as predecessor of Agency for International De-
velopment), advocating encouragement of groups within the Latin American governments
who favor self-help measures. 107 CoNG. REc. 15763 (1961).
108. See Resolution "E" (Public Opinion and the Alliance for Progress) adopted at
Punta del Este. PAN AMERICAN UNION, ALLIANCE FOR PRaORESS, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTs
48-49 (1961). See similar view expressed with regard to United States' seeking publicity for
expenditures in Latin America. 1961 Hearings 65.
109. Although the major investment in Latin America envisaged under the Alliance
program is that by the private sector, both domestic and foreign, the crucial catalyst for
this process is to be foreign governmental funds, of which the United States has pledged the
largest share (ten billion dollars or more). See Progress of the Alliance, Americas, June
1962, p. 3; speech by President Kennedy, quoted at 107 CONG. REc. 15566 (1961) ; and text ac-
companying notes 44-53 supra.
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The United States Congress cannot directly legislate land reform programs for
Latin American countries; instead, it must attempt to induce action on the
part of the legislature of each of the recipient countries." 0 Thus, land and
other reforms may be stipulated as prerequisites to receiving economic as-
sistance from the United States,"' in an indirect legislative process analogous
to that used by the federal government when it seeks, through strings on
dollar support, to promote in the states programs felt to be most suitably under
their direct control.112 It is, however, a political fact of life of foreign aid pro-
grams that rigid adherence to stated legislative prerequisites may not be pos-
sible in seeking to implement the concurrently stated over-all legislative pur-
pose of the aid. Though the blunt instrument of cutting off all aid until reforms
are forthcoming has been advocated by certain members of Congress,l1s one
commentator has noted that:
. each government understands that the most frequent cause of unilater-
al requirements is domestic political pressure, and this common under-
standing encourages tolerance and mutual forbearance. . . . The most
important fact about American "strings" is that the various sanctions
available to U.S. aid administrators are either too severe or too trivial
110. 'Wfe obviously can't say we are going to dictate the land reform legislation of
another country but we can provide help where the right kind of legislation is forthcoming
and refrain from providing help where it doesn't." Statement by Lincoln Gordon as con-
sultant for the President's Task Force on Latin America, 1961 Hearings 65; statement by
Senator Fulbright, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1961, p. 1, col. 4.
The nature of Congress' limited authority to affect land tenure conditions in Latin
America results in there being necessarily involved, in addition to United States economic
aid legislation, the following intermediate steps in the indirect legislative process: United
States administrators seeking to implement policy; United States administrators negotiating
with Latin American administrators; Latin American administrators seeking to influence
legislative decision-making in their own countries; the passage of land reform statutes by
the legislatures of Latin America; and, finally, the effectuation of those laws. For an
examination of each of the steps in the process as outlined for the purpose of identifying
past difficulties and suggesting means of improving the process, see Wickersham, Land
Tenure Reform: Implementing the Goals of the Alliance for Progress 20-31 (Unpublished
divisional paper on file in Yale Law Library).
111. See Kennedy Message to Congress, supra note 83, at 476:
Even at the start such measures will be a condition of assistance from the social
fund. Priorities will depend not merely on need, but on the demonstrated readiness of
each government to make the institutional improvements which promise lasting
social progress.
But see Statement by Secretary Dillon, 44 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 693, 696 (1961) ("The phrase
'self-help' should not be interpreted to mean conditions imposed by a country as the price of
external assistance."). Compare statement by Secretary Dillon, 1961 Hearings 11 ("the
new alliance for progress demands self-help measures on the part of the Latin American
countries as a pre-condition for assistance... "').
112. E.g., federal standards provisions in the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 627, 629, 631
(1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-02, 701-03, 711-13 (1958). See Reich, Midnight Wel-
fare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963).
113. See N.Y. Times, May 10, 1961, p. 1, col. 4. It must be recognized, of course, that
such demands might well reflect anti-foreign aid carping by some members of Congress
rather than specific concern that the conditions have not been met.
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to be effective. Withdrawing a program or even withholding funds for a
period defeats the object of the aid, a fact well known to both parties.114
This observation is particularly applicable in relation to Latin America, and it
provides a typical chicken-egg conundrum: insistence that no dollars will be
forthcoming unless and until reforms are accomplished is an overly simplistic
view, since often no reforms can be attained unless and until dollars are
given 11-either because of the catalytic effect of foreign aid in encouraging
development, 116 or because of the need to support shaky governments and
foreign exchange positions so as to make development possible." 7
If complete curtailment of funds or their continued free availability are the
only two alternatives in the area of economic sanctions, the prospects for "in-
direct legislation" are dim indeed. The consequences of complete cession seem
intolerable, but continuing a full aid program in the face of recurring rebuffs
also presents severe difficulties. Latin American countries will probably retain
their reluctance to undergo reforms so long as United States officials fail to
impress upon them the essential role of such reform in the Alliance.118 Especial-
ly if aid is given on bases no different from the criteria imposed under pre-
vious programs, or if "emergency" pleas for aid are satisfied without reference
to the need for institutional reforms, the firmness of United States purpose is
apt to be doubted." 9 But completed reform need not be postulated as the condi-
tion to be met before any aid is received; indeed, a realistic appraisal of the
legislative-administrative process involved in instituting reform measures in
Latin America--of the radical nature of the changes being sought in centuries-
old social and economic patterns-must recognize that achievement of Al-
114. M ONTGouRY, THE PoLrrics OF FOREIGN Am 104-06 (1962).
115. See N.Y. Times, March 6, 1962, p. 9, col. 1, and Feb. 28, 1962, p. 7, col. 2. Cf. 1961
Hearings 25.
116. See N.Y. Times, March 12, 1962, p. 12, col. 1.
117. Id. at p. 12, col. 4; see statement by Teodoro Moscoso, in Newsweek, Aug. 27,
1962, p. 46, to the effect that much of what money has been spent is not for development at
all: "[Most,] unfortunately has been used to cover government deficits, support shaky cur-
rencies, and keep countries from going bankrupt.' This explanation was relied upon by AID
officials (when they were not contradictorily claiming that reforms really had taken place)
seeking to justify loan and grant commitments they had made during the first year of the
Alliance when few if any reforms were evident. See 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at 93-104,
138-40; Hanson, supra note 93, at 11.
118. More positive methods must be employed to emphasize the fact that the United
States intends to insist upon these preconditions and that paper pledges will not suffice.
Persuasive efforts to date apparently have been relatively ineffective. A Senate group
which visited Latin America shortly after the signing of the Act of Bogoti and the Charter
of Punta del Este reported that it found "absolutely no evidence of any intention to imple-
ment the self-help measures which were a part of the alliance-for-progress program." And
accounts of inactivity in the area of land reform and overall planning continue to appear
in the press, along with suggestions that "many Latin Americans simply don't understand
what the Alliance for Progress is about.' See "The Alliance for Progress: The Big Need is
for Deeds," Newsweek, Aug. 27, 1962, pp. 45, 47; 103 CoNG. REc. 20282 (1962).
119. On the need for United States officials to continue to press for the Alliance re-
quirement of reform in order to make the program credible to Latin Americans, see
RAUSHENBusIH, THE CHALLENGE TO THE ALLIANCE FOR PRoGREss 48-62 (1962).
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liance goals will to a large extent be a step-by-step process of maturation. 12 0
As Secretary Dillon, in his role as United States representative to the Inter-
American Development Bank, has stated in reference to land and tax reforms:
"We obviously would not expect that a country had to reach perfection before
they got any money in these areas, but if they were making progress and
were moving in these fields we would help them."' 121 Thus, it is progress
toward reform that the Alliance contemplates, and so long as such progress is
occurring it should be rewarded. 22
However, the decision to reward less-than-total reform at preliminary stages
does not imply that distinctions cannot be made in terms of the amount of
dollar support to be given for varying degrees of progress attained by a recipi-
ent country. In effect, administrative flexibility may be achieved by viewing
each dollar as a separate weapon in the United States arsenal. 2 3 Alliance
funds, for example, may be used to help finance the preparation of plans de-
signed to meet Alliance standards, 124 while further assistance is conditioned on
putting the programs called for by these plans into operation. Even this latter
step may be broken down into stages, with given dollar amounts "tied" to
different steps in fulfillment of the program. A recent case in which this ap-
proach was followed (apparently for the first time) was the conditioning treat-
ment given Brazil when she requested additional Alliance funds.125 A twelve-
point fiscal reform program was outlined, with "rewards" to be given as each
level was reached. A similar technique, of course, could be applied to stimulate
land tenure reform. Furthermore, this more discriminating use of available
funds, exacting specific assurances, is in exact harmony with the conceptual
basis of the Alliance as a joint venture of partners grounded in a self-help
system rather than a unilateral financing operation by the United States. 2 6
The advantages of this last technique, the "r~ward" system of continuous
financing, suggest the stance United States and regional administrators should
120. See President Kennedy's Foreign Aid Message to Congress, N.Y. Times, March
14, 1962, p. 4, col. 4. See also 108 CONG. REc. 9960 (1962) (remarks of Senator Smathers).
The phrase "decade of development" has been employed by President Kennedy to refer
to both the overall United States foreign aid commitment to underdeveloped nations, and
the Alliance program in particular. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1961, p. 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times,
March 14, 1962, p. 4, col. 4.
121. 1961 Hearings 50.
122. See Address by President Kennedy, 28 VITAL SPEECHES 354 (1962).
123. Dollar distinctions are a logical and ready tool for differentiating among both de-
grees of a country's progress and relative country positions along the spectrum of pro-
gress toward reform.
124. This approach has already been employed in certain cases. AID has obligated it-
self to assist at least six countries in the preparation of national economic plans for long-
range development, although not explicitly authorized to do so by the terms of the pro-
gram. 1962 Hearings at 70-72.
125. See Time, April 5, 1963, p. 30.
126. Statement by Teodoro Moscoso, 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at 4. Leaders in those Latin
American nations which have taken what they consider to be vigorous self-help measures
express concern that the United States fails to distinguish among aid recipients on this
previously announced basis. See comments by Chilean officials, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1962,
p. 5, col. 3, and Feb. 28, 1962, p. 7, col. 3.
[Vol. 73 : 310
THE CHILEAN LAND REFORM
take when faced with a statute of the Chilean type which is less than adequate
as measured against a set of social and economic reform priorities. For these
administrators must decide whether to continue aid despite the acknowledged
weaknesses in the land reform law.127 Naturally, the issue must be viewed in
context, since the aid-worthiness of a country within the Alliance scheme may
depend upon such other factors as fiscal and urban land reforms. 128 Moreover,
the benefits to be derived from having a program presently in operation may
be of great value as long as the existence of the statute does not relieve all
pressure for more effective measures.1 29 Existing programs can serve as a
laboratory where desirable modifications may be discovered; and even if the
total number of present beneficiaries seems inadequate, living conditions will
be improved for those families who do receive land as a result of the reform.
By continuing payments in recognition of initial efforts toward reform, the
attitude that the Alliance truly is a partnership may be fostered within the
recipient country. 3 0 Thus aid should continue to be provided, but with more
circumspection and a greater degree of control exercised where a less-than-
adequate measure provides a program's basis. The possibility of marginal im-
provements in the participating country's program should be explored and
aid tied specifically to accomplishment of these advances.
Chile, one of the principal recipients of Alliance funds to date, 113 would be
particularly susceptible to this type of influence. In recent years, Chile's dollar
reserves have been severely depleted due to an increasingly unfavorable balance
of payments, and United States grants and loans have been relied upon to re-
duce this imbalance.132 Therefore, the threat that this aid will be reduced if Chile
127. See text at notes 65-75 supra.
128. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
129. See statement by Teodoro Moscoso in reference to Chilean statute, N.Y. Times,
March 8, 1962, p. 9, col. 3. See The Atlantic Report on Chile, Atlantic Jan. 1963, p. 22.
130. See statement by Robert Cutler, United States Executive Director of the Inter-
American Development Bank (succeeding Secretary Dillon) :
Now you come to the more basic criteria of what is the country doing in land re-
form, in tax reform, and in creating national planning bodies.
If we can find that the country has taken these steps, is taking them, or has ex-
pressed what I judge is a credible intention that it is going to do it, then I feel that
... it is proper to make these loans to encourage the Latin American people, to give
them the belief that it is an alliance and, if they will keep on, there is hope for them.
1962 Hearings, pt. 1, at 265-66. Especially if aid continues to flow to members of the Al-
liance which have made considerably less progress than the country under consideration will
there be resentment of the fact that the United States is not making its contribution to the
partnership to match efforts taken by the Latin American country. For Chilean expression
of this opinion, see N.Y. Times, March 5, 1962, p. 5, col. 3; Pan American Union, "The
Alliance for Progress Weekly Report," April 8, 1963, p. 60.
131. See AID figures given in Hanson, supra note 93, at 6. Chile was also one of the
principal beneficiaries of pre-Alliance assistance to Latin America. See AID, U.S. Foreign
Assistance, at 66 (March 21, 1962).
132. See The Atlantic Report on Chile, note 129 supra at 20; 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at
157 (showing relationship between domestic revenues and foreign aid receipts); N.Y.
Times, March 6, 1962, p. 9, col. 1.
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fails to fulfill Alliance commitments may have a strongly coercive effect, even
though United States administrators would probably hesitate to exert full
pressure in this direction for fear of causing chaos in the Chilean economy.133
And, since increasing Chilean demands for domestic reform have not been
satisfied,' 34 primarily because of the lack of funds to support such projects, 13
local political pressure will tend to increase the United States' leverage. The
Alliance may provide the pot of gold to accomplish these goals, and govern-
mental action or inaction endangering that source of funds would be viewed
with grave public disfavor. 3 '
Thus, within the existing framework of the land reform law, Alliance ad-
ministrators bargaining for the disbursement of further funds might require
that the number of new economic units created annually be raised from the
currently planned rate of 15,000.137 Land tenure studies are now being con-
ducted by Alliance-affiliated research teams ;138 these could provide the basis
for creating a scale by which larger amounts of financial aid would be given as
larger numbers of new landholdings are distributed. Efforts to expand the
amount of expropriable property within both of the basic classes could also be
encouraged: if additional United States funds were allocated to irrigation pro-
jects under the statute, more land would be subject to expropriation since the
reform law authorizes the government to take up to half of lands so bene-
fited ;139 also, United States money could aid the formulation of Regional De-
velopment Plans, making the lands encompassed in those plans subject to ex-
propriation. 140
Administrators might also try to induce Chile to adopt a tax program that
would play a more positive role in bringing about redistribution. The United
States could agree specifically to underwrite in part the income-loss cost of
the Chilean government's present program of inducing private sale of lati-
fundios by granting tax concessions to the sellers.' 4' If tax rates, including
133. But see 1962 Hearings, pt. 3, at 100-01, for report and denial that United States aid
had been held up because of Chile's reluctance to fulfill promises of social and economic
reforms.
134. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1961, p. 9, col. 1; Carroll, supra note 79, at 200-01; HER-
aiNG, A HISTORY OF LATIN AmFmucA 608 (1961):
Thoughtful Chileans hope that such land reform may come peacefully, with fair
compensation to the present owners and with wise settlement of new farmers. But
they face the threat that an angry proletariat might choose reforms by violence, after
the fashion of Mexico or Cuba, with dire consequences to social stability.
135. See text at note 15 supra.
136. See Piic, CHILE AND THE UNrrED STATES 297 (1963).
137. See text at note 61 supra.
138. See Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (CIDA), Land
Tenure Project Outline, p. B-3 (July 1962 draft). Also, the extensive land survey being
conducted in Chile is regarded as one of the largest multi-purpose projects of its kind in
Latin America or possibly the world. Results will contribute to Alliance planning for de-
velopment programs. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 31, col. 6.
139. See text at note 40 supra.
140. See text at note 43 supra.
141. See Pan American Union, The Alliance for Progress Weeldy Report, March 25,
1963, p. 19.
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such subsidized conversions, can be maintained and landowners are allowed to
raise their assessments in expectation of government expropriation, increased
revenues will be available to support a more extensive land purchase pro-
gram. 142 Administrative convenience will be served, moreover, by the avail-
ability of a readily ascertainable value for all property subject to expropria-
tion. 43 By assigning essentially self-declared tax-assessment values as the
price to be paid upon expropriation, the government can induce property
owners to raise their assessments and, during the interim preceding expropria-
tion, pay more reasonable rates. On the other hand, the threat of expropria-
tion based on assessment value might only cause owners to leave present low
assessments unchanged for tax purposes and fight an expansion of the govern-
ment's expropriation power all the more bitterly. Inducement of all these
beneficial measures, moreover, may be insufficient for achievement of an op-
timal land redistribution program because of the inherent limitations in the
basic Chilean land reform law; therefore, additional and stronger legislation
should be sought. Since difficulties in financing 4 4 and limitations on the
properties subject to expropriation 145 are the primary defects in the present
law, they should be the prime objects of remedial legislation. Administrators
might pledge additional aid if a deferred payment program for expropriated land
is enacted and enforced. Similar resort to economic pressure might be em-
ployed in an effort to convince Chilean leaders that some of the better land
from latifundios must be redistributed if the goals of the Alliance are to be
reached. 14 6
142. See Carroll, supra note 79, at 191; Taxation and Public Regulation of Private
Land Uses, in LAND TENURE 642 (Parsons, Penn, & Raup ed. 1956). The imposition of
raising of land taxes will have a three-fold effect: in addition to encouraging sales, it will
tend to drive down land prices and also increase government revenues. U.N. EcoSoc CoUN-
cIL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 167 and 22.
143. This value would not necessarily be equal to the actual assessment, since that
figure might be set uniformly at a percentage of calculated value, in which case the proper
amount can be determined by reversing the computation.
144. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
145. See note 40 supra.
146. The potential impact of the Alliance upon land tenure and living conditions in Latin
America, particularly Chile, is summarized in PIRE, op. cit. supra note 136, at 297:
Instead of maling aid dependent, as in the past largely it has been, upon the will-
ingness of the recipient country to balance its budget and refrain from any practice
that seems to deviate from free-enterprise capitalism, the United States must insist
resolutely, as it has begun tenuously to do, upon attaching different sets of strings.
An overhauling of domestic structures, aimed at social amelioration, must be the
price of assistance. If it were clearly understood among all social sectors in Chile
that United States economic help would henceforth be conditional upon the enact-
ment of progressive taxation legislation, upon efficient use of land and/or redistri-
bution of it, and upon the undertaking of vast housing and education projects, the
Chilean rulers would be hard pressed to withstand the pressure. Even in the 1950's,
with the United States operating as a factor to aid them in their stand-pattism, they
found it increasingly difficult to resist the clamor of the left for change. If the United
States began to some degree to side with the underprivileged, it would help guarantee
a lessening of social injustice and would at the same time act to prevent the non-
communist left from gravitating increasingly toward the communist world.
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